It’s you can modify the settings file you sure as hell can put the malware anywhere you want
True. (But in case it amuses you or others reading along:) But a code settings file still carries it’s own special risk, as an executable file, in a predictable place, that gets run regularly.
An executable settings file is particularly nice for the attacker, as it’s a great place to ensure that any injected code gets executed without much effort.
In particular, if an attacker can force a reboot, they know the settings file will get read reasonably early during the start-up process.
So a settings file that’s written in code can be useful for an attacker who can write to the disk (like through a poorly secured upload prompt), but doesn’t have full shell access yet.
They will typically upload a reverse shell, and use a line added to settings to ensure the reverse shell gets executed and starts listening for connections.
Edit (because it may also amuse anyone reading along): The same attack can be accomplished with a JSON or YAML settings file, but it relies on the JSON or YAML interpreter having a known critical security flaw. Thankfully most of them don’t usually have one, most of the time, if they’re kept up to date.
A good place to put persistent malware. That’s why when using docker images always mount as ro if at all possible.
It’s you can modify the settings file you sure as hell can put the malware anywhere you want
True. (But in case it amuses you or others reading along:) But a code settings file still carries it’s own special risk, as an executable file, in a predictable place, that gets run regularly.
An executable settings file is particularly nice for the attacker, as it’s a great place to ensure that any injected code gets executed without much effort.
In particular, if an attacker can force a reboot, they know the settings file will get read reasonably early during the start-up process.
So a settings file that’s written in code can be useful for an attacker who can write to the disk (like through a poorly secured upload prompt), but doesn’t have full shell access yet.
They will typically upload a reverse shell, and use a line added to settings to ensure the reverse shell gets executed and starts listening for connections.
Edit (because it may also amuse anyone reading along): The same attack can be accomplished with a JSON or YAML settings file, but it relies on the JSON or YAML interpreter having a known critical security flaw. Thankfully most of them don’t usually have one, most of the time, if they’re kept up to date.
Every environment has plenty of good places to put persistent malware. Even if you run your docker images as ro.