• 0 Posts
  • 90 Comments
Joined 1 year ago
cake
Cake day: June 12th, 2023

help-circle
  • Others may have better, or fancier solutions, but I’m a fan VPN -> Home Network -> VNC over SSH/TLS for Linux boxes, and RDP for Windows.

    Again, none of VNC or RDP ports or services are ever exposed externally, and even on the LAN, they require authentication and use secure tunnels.

    Full disclosure, I haven’t used RDP in a while and I don’t know what version of SSL/TLS it comes with anymore.

    I know their are self-hosted AnyDesk style options and maybe they’re better than my approach, but I’ve never used them so I can’t really speak on that.





  • circuscritic@lemmy.catoAndroid@lemmy.worldChromium shift
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    1
    ·
    edit-2
    24 days ago

    Regardless, most of those VPN-based ad blockers are just using their own flavor and combination of block lists. I’m sure some get a little fancier, but that’s gist of it. Which is something, that ProtonVPN also offers I think they call it netshield or something like that.


  • circuscritic@lemmy.catoAndroid@lemmy.worldChromium shift
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    2
    ·
    edit-2
    24 days ago

    The paid brave VPN service? If so, I can’t speak to it because I have never used it, but I assume it functions much like a normal VPN provider where they’re running their own ad block lists on the exit node, but I have no idea what those lists are or their effectiveness. And yes, that would prevent your from concurrently running another systemwide VPN tunnel.

    Firefox with uBo is good and not trying to convince you to abandon Firefox on Android, certainly not for your desktop OS.

    The issue that thought is OP is referring to is about security, and while privacy and security aren’t mutually exclusive, sometimes you trade off one for the other.

    Personally, I prefer Chromium forks because I already take other privacy measures that I’m content with, and I would prefer the security advantages those browsers provide on Android.

    But sometimes, if there’s a website that I trust is not malicious, but there is an extension I prefer to view it with, I use Mull or Ice Raven. Both being Firefox on android forks, the former being a security/privacy hardened variant.

    I want to reiterate, that this is only in regards to Android browsers and I’m definitely not saying to install Google Chrome, or even Google’s own Chromium. I’m talking about hardened forks of their open source chromium project, such as Mulch and Cromite.



  • What if I told you I work in information security, and your not impressing me, or tripping me up, by using terms like defense in depth and attack chains, nor am I confused and unable see through your misrepresenting Graphene’s threat model to imply it only matters for high threat risk individuals.

    Just because I said I don’t have enough low level understanding of Android development to refute those devs write-ups on Android browser security, doesn’t mean I’m coming here without a professionally informed understanding of security, and all the terms you keep throwing out to muddy the issue.

    So, I’ll leave it there. I will take my professional knowledge and experiences, along with my judgment on which sources I incorporate into my broader understanding of this situation, and agree to disagree with your analysis and conclusions.


  • Extensions are another vector. But putting that aside, because I agree ads are a much larger threat:

    https://github.com/uazo/cromite

    Cromite a Bromite fork with ad blocking and privacy enhancements; take back your browser!

    Also, Mulch lets you pick your DNS provider. So even if you don’t already have system, or network, wide ad blocking, it’s not like you’re deluged in ads.

    Again, I’m not saying no one should use Gecko based browsers, I’m just repeating what developers of respected hardened security ROMs have written about. Actually, that’s not true, I’m taking a softer approach as the GrapheneOS wiki/FAQ says NOT to use Gecko based browsers.



  • It’s like you’re arguing because you like to argue, and can’t admit that you’re wrong. So you keep finding new ways to qualify your response in the hopes that I forget what this is even about.

    Chromium is significantly more secure than Firefox Gecko on Android. That is according to the developers of probably the two most well regarded hardened Android ROMs.

    One of which, Graphene, even advises completely avoiding Gecko based browsers.

    Which is what I said in my original comment, well, the part about relative security.

    You’ve also claimed that at most, a malicious android application can only harm battery life and cause network issues, which is objectively false. I’m honestly kind of confused why you even said that, but whatever.

    I never said no one should use Firefox based browsers on Android, I just said they weren’t as secure and that user should understand the risks associated with them.

    But what I’m most confused and perplexed by, is your insistence that only high risk individuals should be concerned with using a browser that comes with, at minimum, double the attack service they’re exposed to when browsing the web.

    Again, that is per the GrapheneOS wiki/FAQ.

    I mean, we’re not talking about some hardcore and incredibly inconvenient levels of unnecessary OPSEC for the sake of OPSEC, we’re talking about a browser.

    Tell you what, if you post a link to your GitHub showing me the hardened Android ROM that you develop, or heavily contribute to, I would be happy to revise my opinion on your credibility versus those developers.


  • Right, so if Gecko based browsers can cause that kind of security concern on Graphene, what does that mean for people using Android ROMs that are not hardened, or, OEM variants that do not receive regular security updates?

    Any app installed by a user that takes advantage of an active and unpatched CVE, can do all sorts of actions to compromise an entire phone, or critical parts of it. Are you saying that’s not the case?

    The difference between a compromised app, and a browser, is that even a “safe” Firefox install is used to browse a near infinite possibility of websites, any number of which might be running an active campaign targeting unpatched Android vulnerabilities.

    It sounds like you’re saying that despite Firefox Geckos significantly larger attack surface, the fact that Chromium doesn’t eliminate all risk, means there’s no difference.


  • circuscritic@lemmy.catoAndroid@lemmy.worldWe need LibreWolf of android.
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    5
    arrow-down
    1
    ·
    edit-2
    25 days ago

    Avoid Gecko-based browsers like Firefox as they’re currently much more vulnerable to exploitation and inherently add a huge amount of attack surface. Gecko doesn’t have a WebView implementation (GeckoView is not a WebView implementation), so it has to be used alongside the Chromium-based WebView rather than instead of Chromium, which means having the remote attack surface of two separate browser engines instead of only one. Firefox / Gecko also bypass or cripple a fair bit of the upstream and GrapheneOS hardening work for apps. Worst of all, Firefox does not have internal sandboxing on Android.

    https://grapheneos.org/usage#web-browsing

    That sounds like the exposed attack surface is a lot more than just whatever sites are running under your Firefox process.

    But what do I know, I’m not a developer of security-hardened Android forks, so I just have to pick which randos on the internet I choose to believe. When the developers of DivestOS and GrapheneOS both have lengthy write-ups on why chromium base browsers are significantly more secure, I’m going to believe them because I don’t have the low level technical knowledge to refute what they’re saying.






  • What is per-site process isolation?

    Per-site process isolation is a powerful security feature that seeks to limit exposure of a malicious website/script abusing a security vulnerability. Firefox calls per-site process isolation Fission and is enabled by default on desktop. Fission is not yet enabled by default on Android, and when manually enabled it results in a severely degraded/broken experience. Furthermore Firefox on Android does not take advantage of Android’s isolatedProcess flag for completely confining application services. Standalone Chromium based browsers strictly isolate websites to their own process.

    https://divestos.org/pages/browsers

    Source: The developer of Mull, Mulch, & DivestOS



  • circuscritic@lemmy.catoAndroid@lemmy.worldWe need LibreWolf of android.
    link
    fedilink
    English
    arrow-up
    39
    arrow-down
    17
    ·
    edit-2
    25 days ago

    This always gets downvoted, because it’s a painful truth, but Chromium on Android is significantly more secure than Firefox.

    There is a reason why the default included browser on GrapheneOS, Vanadium, is a Chromium fork.

    So I’m sorry, until Firefox on Android catches up to Chromium, another Firefox fork isn’t going to make the impact on the ecosystem that you think it is.

    I’m not saying you can’t or shouldn’t use Firefox forks on Android, I’m saying do so being aware of their limitations relative to Chromium forks, such as Cromite, or Mulch, the latter being the same dev as Mull. That same dev also has a lengthy write-up going over the technical details of why Chromium is more secure than Firefox on Android.

    This has nothing to do with desktop browser engines, this is specifically and exclusively in regards to Android browsers